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Cohen: Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda

LEGISPRUDENCE: PROBLEMS AND
AGENDA
Julius Cohen*
The inquiries of jurisprudence in this country have focused
mainly on the judicial side of the legal order--on the formal structure of the legal order that validates judicial authority; on the conceptual apparatus of judicial law; on the behavioral patterns and historical development of judicial institutions; on the logic of judicial
reasoning; on the social ends that courts profess to serve; on the ethical ideals towards which they should strive; on the criticism and
evaluation of judge-made law, etc. An assortment of "school" labels
has often accompanied these intellectual endeavors--e.g., analytical,
sociological, historical, philosophical-each often claiming superiority at the expense of the modest truth, namely, that each represents
no more than a different, strongly emphasized, but non-competing
focus on a given corpus of inquiry. If, broadly speaking, jurisprudence is a theoretical account of the legal order, in both its positive
and normative aspects, one would logically expect the legislative side
of the legal order also to be within its inquiring ambit. However,
judging by the quantum of intellectual output on the subject appearing in jurisprudential literature, such is not the case; comparatively
little writing energy has been devoted to examining the legislative
aspects of the legal order.1 Jurisprudence in practice has been primarily court-oriented, addressing only a part-albeit a significant
part-of the legal order. If one may label the limited scope of this
jurisprudential enterprise, it might suggestively be called judicativeprudence, a theoretical study of the judicial component of the
legal order.
Legisprudence,2 its counterpart on the legislative side of the le*

Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law; Visiting Distin-

guished Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.

1. For a step in the right direction, see Symposium on JudicialLaw Making in Relation
to Statutes, 36

2.

IND.

L.J. 411 (1961).

My earlier use of the term is in the piece, Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence,

59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950).
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gal order, has, with notable exceptions,3 been left to languish. Much
of this is no doubt due to the fact that the "law" studied in law
schools is primarily the "law" emanating from the courts. This unilateral academic focus is based on the assumption that the locus of
conflict resolution by lawyers is primarily in the judicial arena. The
influential, though much misunderstood, observation by Justice
Holmes that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law,"' 4 lent jurisprudential fuel to the notion that the judiciary is at the center of the
legal universe. There was added fuel in the much quoted statement
of John Chipman Gray that "it is with the meaning declared by the
courts, and with no other meaning, that [statutes] are imposed upon
the community as Law."5
It is now a matter of common knowledge-sufficient even for
the technical test of judicial notice-that conflict resolution is often
securely and definitively accomplished by lawyers who do battle in
the legislative and administrative arenas as in the judicial, and that a
host of legal norms are sufficiently unambiguous for effective implementation without the need to run the gauntlet of judicial interpretation or of constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the principles that
underlie discrete judicial decisions-the real law of the decisions
-spring from the same communal source as do the principles that
underlie discrete legislative enactments. Both are ultimately accountable to the same communal ideals of the larger community of which
the legal community is but a part, albeit a salient part.
It is this kinship with communal roots and communal accountability that has prompted suggestions that the judiciary and the legislature be integrated in their decision-making processes in the interest
of coherence of policy, instead of being separated into two competing
fiefdoms of the order. These suggestions still await full implementation. Even Pound's prediction as early as 1908-that statutes will
3. For the especially salutary contributions of Ernst Freund and Frank E. Horack, see E.
Horack, The Common Law of Leg-

FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917);
Islation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41(1937).

4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (emphasis added).
This could be wrongly taken by some to imply that the perspective of the practitioner interested in the outcome of litigation is the only perspective on "the law." The statement obviously
does not address itself to the judge who is not concerned with how he will decide a case, but
how he ought to decide it-a normative, not a predictive task. On the latter, much of what
Holmes had to say was significant, but in the context of a judicial, and not a legislative, orientation. See Id. at 461-78.
5. J. C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170 (1909) (emphasis in
original).
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eventually be dealt with as principles and not merely as discrete
rules, and will be reasoned from by analogy on a coordinate par with
judicial rules and their underlying principles--has still not securely
and comfortably come to pass.
Aside from the fact that legisprudence has suffered an identity
problem because of the overshadowing presence of judicativeprudence, two other types of problems confront the field. The
first is primarily environmental and relates to the terrain as well as
to the intellectual and professional climate that legisprudence needs
in order to develop and flourish-a problem exterior to the subject
matter of the field. The second type of problem--of an internal nature-relates to those salient questions that need to be raised within
the field itself, as well as the difficulties that might be encountered in
coping with them.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF TERRAIN

The terrain of legisprudence is considerably rougher than that
of judicativeprudence. The legislative arm of the legal order conjures
up images of bias, emotionalism, wheeling and dealing, maneuvering
for power, compromise, etc. The judicial arm, at its best, is thought
of as reflective, deliberative, objective, and, above all, rational. Legislators are thought to be susceptible to appeals to sentiment, or to
power; hearings on the merits of proposed legislation must contend
with prior partisan commitment; final votes are rarely influenced by
debate; and final decisions are not defended by reasoned written
opinions.7
Because these factors add up to a process whose character is
perceived as "political," it might be asked how such an unruly process could possibly be intellectually tamed by inquiries of legisprudence. The response might well be that the comparative unruliness of the legislative process should be no more of a deterrent to
theoretical inquiry than the turbulence of weather to the study of
meteorology. Indeed, the legislative process may be in some ways
even more complex than the process of judicial decision-making.
There are many varied voices which must be heard and somehow be
reduced, after compromise, to an aggregate expressed in statutory
form. Judicial voices-comparatively few in number--come into
play after the turbulence of legislating is over; as a result, the setting
6. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1908).
7. See Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore?, 37 MINN. L. REV. 34 (1952).
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is conducive to cooler deliberation and reflection because the
problems faced are different. General policy and principle are not
confronted at the outset; rather, the judiciary is activated into dealing with them later when difficult questions concerning their meaning, application, refinement, coherence, and/or validity are presented. Inquiry is set within parameters of orderly combat between
specially trained adversaries; decision, for the most part, is accompanied by written justificatory opinion. Like the wholesaler and the retailer, the legislature and the judiciary deal in and with the same
product, but in significantly different ways.
What is often lost sight of, however, in comparing the reflective
coolness and deliberativeness of the judicial process with the politically charged atmosphere of the legislative process is that both ascriptions are mere caricatures-partly true, but somewhat exaggerated. There are "relatively stable and strongly stabilizing factors" 8
behind much of the surface turbulence of the legislative process; by
the same token, "political" considerations have been known to insinuate their presence in judicial decision-making. 9 Thus, the issue is
not the extent to which the legislative process falls short of the ideals
of the judicial, or whether there are slight family resemblances and
overlappings between the two; it is rather that both processes must
be seen as serving two different, but complementary functions and,
therefore, they should be contrasted instead of compared. With this
in mind, they both must be analyzed, conceptualized, synthesized,
and criticized, if jurisprudence, in the broad sense, is rightfully to
claim philosophical jurisdiction over a deeper, more pervasive understanding of the legal process.
II.

THE CLIMATE FOR LEGISPRUDENCE

As a coordinate branch of jurisprudence, legisprudence is necessarily a theoretical discipline, concerned with general and abstract
issues of more immediate interest to the philosophical analyst or
critic than to the legal practitioner or legislator. There are theorists
who defensively point out that the better the theory behind a prac8. This expression was the hallmark of Karl Llewellyn's influential work, K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960), in which he sought to

demonstrate that appellate courts, long criticized for the intrusion of an arbitrary "political"
element in its decision-making process, were actually governed by "relatively stable and
strongly stabilizing factors." This author postulates that similar discoverable factors would be
found to be at work in the day-to-day operations of the legislative process.
9. See generally C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965).
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tice, the better the practice."0 However true this might be as an abstract proposition, the distance between theorists and practitioners is
far greater than between theory and practice. The practitioner is uncomfortable with the language of theory and the questions that it
poses. They seem remote from immediate problem-solving; one can,
moreover, point to successful practitioners who were weaned on
"how-to-do-it" teaching programs without exposure to the more theoretical or "insight" courses of a law school curriculum. The looming
shadow of the bar examination-an exercise in rote and situational
"logic"-places understandable pressure on law schools with limited
energies and resources to respond to the more immediate concerns of
would-be practitioners and to the professionals of a highly technical
discipline. The engineer and the medical practitioner are species of
the same generic class of practicalists with corresponding distance
from the theoretical side of their respective undertakings. In schools
of law, the presence of theory-oriented offerings is often a byproduct
of the boredom of second and third-year courses that run the case
system of teaching into the ground in a never-ending drive for more
and more technical coverage. The ideal environment, then, for the
research and critical functions of legisprudence, as well as for judicativeprudence, is one in which these functions are supported, maintained, and staffed independently of the teaching function.
This does not rule out the gifted teacher who is also a gifted
researcher and critic. It does, however, indicate the need to make
research and criticism ongoing and not occasional. There are laboratories and think-tanks that are known to operate full-time; 1 schools
for practitioners need no prodding in that direction. Of course, the
efforts of both theorist and practitioner must ultimately meet and
intertwine. Practice is ultimately indebted to theory for direction
(i.e. social needs or ends) and conceptualization; theory is beholden
to practice for its raw materials and its function as a constant check
on the "fit" of theory. The yield of research and criticism should,
therefore, ideally filter into the teaching program and into the work
of the practitioner.
Both legisprudence and judicativeprudence merit study not only
for their practical consequences, but also for the light that they shed
on the larger problems of the human predicament. In the words of a
keen observer: "Civilized life would be sadly impoverished if litera10. See Holmes, supra note 4, at 477.
11.

The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., the Urban Institute in Washington,

D.C., and the Hoover Institute in Palo Alto, California, are obvious examples.
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ture were devoted entirely to advertising or propaganda, even for
righteous causes, or if the fine arts were used only for practical purposes rather than as ends in themselves enriching the enjoyment of
life."112 On the assumption that most social relations are potentially
legal-involving virtually every branch of human thought and activity-such a theoretical enterprise, if taken seriously, could well encompass a fathomless area of intellectual activity, and involve a
number of interrelated disciplines. This need not, however, invite paralysis at the outset. Modest attempts are still beneficial and the
vastness can be tamed administratively by allocative measures that
efficiently govern the division of talent, energy, and resources.
III.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS: AGENDA FOR LEGISPRUDENCE

Of the many problems which press for attention in the field of
legisprudence, some are contiguous, some seemingly overlap or are
held in common, and some are independent of other disciplinary
lines. No hard and fast territorial boundaries divide the problems,
and it would be fruitless to try to construct such demarcations. Regardless of these common or overlapping properties, there need be no
jurisdictional disputes if the objective is merely to observe these
problems from a different-in this case a legisprudential-point of
view.
A.

The Control Over Legislative Meaning

One of the most vexing and pervasive problems facing legislative rule-making bodies is the inherent inability to frame rules that
exhaust beforehand all of the particular cases to which they should
be applied. A rule cannot a priori hope to claim all of its own instances; thus the inevitable human need for interpretative application. The problem is important because it ultimately concerns the
extent to which the legislature and the judiciary share control over
the life of the legal community. It is an old saying that he who has
control over the interpretation of the law is, by the nature of things,
its master. The problem is also important from the perspective of the
one who is on the losing side of an interpretation by the courts of an
ambiguously or vaguely worded statute. Although courts are free to
and, in special situations, have ordered their interpretations to oper12.
(1933).

M.

COHEN,

LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
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ate prospectively, 13 in most instances the interpretation is retroactive
in effect, 14 causing deprivations, often severe, to those who guessed
wrongly, although reasonably, concerning the meaning of the legislative enactment. Often the "guess" is consistent with four, albeit dissenting, Justices of the Supreme Court and is, therefore, outguessed
by only one vote. Accordingly, the greater the control over meaning
by the legislative body, the greater the assurance that there is fair
notice, prior to a legislative enactment, of what one needs to do in
order to avoid legal sanctions and other deprivations, i.e. to plan
one's conduct, knowing in advance the ways in which one's liberty
will be restricted.
If, as Kelsen has argued, a rule works like a frame within which
different interpretations are possible, 15 then judicial power over legislative decision-making via the task of "interpretation" cannot be
eliminated. Many so-called "rules of interpretation"16 applied by
courts are not in fact guides to the discovery of actual legislative
intent, but rather they are maxims of public policy to be used by
judges in creating legislation out of vague and ambiguous statutes.
In this sense, judicial power over legislative decision-making means
tilling in the same work-field as that of legislators, albeit with
smaller and more refined tools. The question to be faced is whether
such power can be limited and restrained, and if so, to what extent.
It is often assumed that the conventions of language, if rigor13. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), one of a myriad number of
examples, exemplifies the problem. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
331(a), 333(a) (1976) provides criminal penalties for "any person" who introduces adulterated

or misbranded drugs into interstate commerce. Dotterweich, president and general manager of
a pharmaceutical corporation, was charged with a violation. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. The

controversy centered on whether Dotterweich was a "person" as technically defined in the Act.
The Court, splitting five to four, held that Dotterweich was a "person" within the meaning of
the Act and therefore, subject to criminal penalties. See id. at 284-85. Before the decision,

Dotterweich, even with the help of learned counsel, could not have known beforehand the
correct meaning of the law. The decision, nevertheless, followed the normal course of retroac-

tive application.
15.

H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 146 (A. Wedberg trans. 1945)

("The judge is, therefore, always a legislator also in the sense that the contents of his decision
never can be completely determined by the preexisting norm of substantive law.").

16.

A typical example is that statutes in derogation of the common law, and penal stat-

utes, should, in the event of indeterminate meaning, be given a "strict construction." See

United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (penal statute); Coral Gables v.
Christopher, 108 Vt. 414, 189 A. 147 (1937) (statute in derogation of common law). See
generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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ously adhered to, should ideally effectuate the necessary restraint. 7
Yet, even in those instances in which it is agreed that the conventional language is "clear" on its face, it is difficult at times to know
whether conventions of common usage or of technical use are controlling, or whether strong statements of purpose during the course
of debate or incorporated within the enactment itself override conventional usage when the language of purpose and the language of
conventional usage conflict.18 The difficulty involved in the relationship between rule and application stems from the inevitable incompleteness of meanings that attach to symbols. Incomplete symbols
are prevalent and serious both in the fields of ethics and of legislation-legislative principles and policies often parallelling moral
precepts. The notion of "theft," for example, involves the concept of
another person's property, with endless ramifications of title and contract.19 The notion of "life," in legislative, judicial, and moral dealings with the problem of abortion, still remains indeterminate.2 0
Similarly, the concept of "dangerous instrumentality" is far from being made determinate. 21
There are several reasons for employing incomplete symbols in
legislation. In some instances, determinate standards are impossible
to formulate and vague standards such as "reasonable" must do the
job, with delegation at the application stage to a judge, jury, or an
administrative body. Vague criteria like "reasonableness" may be
the only ones plausibly available in such instances because adequate
scientific or conventional tests have not yet been developed.22 In
other instances, however, calculated ambiguity is sought when agreement between competing groups in the legislative arena cannot be
obtained, and maneuvering for a determinate position ceases when
the issue of meaning is brought to the courts. What might be labeled
"artistic obfuscation" is thus often employed. Here, the delegation to
17.

See Dickerson, The Diseases of Legislative Language, 1 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 2, 5

(1964).
18. But see id. at 6 (while task of writing clear statutes remains formidable, problems of
language are largely curable).
19, See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3921-31 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1982) (nine
different categories of theft, differentiated by nature of property taken, title or possession, and
means employed).
20. Two recent attempts were made in Congress to declare legislatively that human life
be deemed to exist from the moment of conception. See S. 2148, 97th. Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(j)
(1982); S. 158, 97th. Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981).
21. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 (1971).
22, See Cohen, supra note 2, at 895-97; Merton, The Role of Applied Social Science in
the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum, 16

PHIL. SCI.
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courts is not unlike an arbitration procedure, in which the competing
parties in effect agree among themselves, by way of compromise, to
permit an impartial third party to settle the matter in dispute.
At best, the limitations of language ordain that clarity and determinateness, even when it is seriously sought, must remain an
ideal, incapable of complete human attainment. A problem which
still remains unanswered, however, is how the legislative process can
best be organized in order, at least, to maximize clarity of expression, when clarity is indeed the goal. The product of the serious
draftsman, no matter how dedicated to and skilled in the goal of
clarity, is valueless unless approval of the legislature can be obtained. It is, of course, theoretically possible for the course of unfavorable judicial interpretations to be changed by corrective legislation. Although this has been done in some instances,23 the practical
difficulties in doing this as a matter of regular course can be overwhelming and crippling, siphoning off precious energies needed for
planning and for the resolution of new problems. Statutory construction statutes also abound,2 4 representing an attempt by legislatures
to establish their overriding authority over judge-made rules of interpretation; but these statutes are themselves full of ambiguities and
25
therefore, remain grist for the judicial mill.
One suggested solution to this ongoing construction and interpretation dilemma is that the legislative body create a special standing committee to clarify existing laws that have produced conflicting
23. For example, Congress can expressly declare that a particular state regulation which
affects interstate commerce is nonetheless a valid exercise of the state's police power and not a
violation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, thereby effectively overruling a
prior Supreme Court decision to the contrary. In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), the
Supreme Court invalidated an Iowa statute prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquors as applied
to sealed kegs stored in Iowa but shipped in from out of state. The Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26
Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1976)), was subsequently enacted, authorizing
states to regulate the use, consumption, sale, or storage of liquor located within the state, no
matter how it was packaged. The validity of the Wilson Act was then upheld by the Court in
the case, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
Corrective legislation has also surfaced at the state level. See MacDonald, The Positionof
Statutory Construction in Present Day Law Practice,3 VAND. L. REV. 369, 377-80 (1950)
(discussing New York Law Revision Commission's attempts to draft legislation overruling various judicial precedents).
24. See, e.g., I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1991 (Purdon Supp. 1982) (statutory
construction provisions).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Messner, 372 Pa. 60, 92 A.2d 417 (1952) (interpreting phrase,
"or otherwise conveyed," in statutory construction statute); Commonwealth v. Massini, 200
Pa. Super. 257, 188 A.2d 816 (1963) (definition of "domestic animal" in statutory construction statute interpreted not to include cats).
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interpretations. 2 This overlooks, however, the role of compromise in
the legislative process-compromise that often results in language
that is in effect a message to the courts to supply judicial gloss to an
otherwise stalemated situation. Much of the frustration with this
problem is a byproduct of its long term existence. Indeed, the commentary Sir Courtenay Ilbert made years ago could just as meaningfully be written today: "[C]ompromise and co-operation are admirable things in politics, but they do not always tend to clearness or
accuracy of style, logical arrangement, or consistency, in literary
composition. 27 In sum, the careful language of the serious, enlightened drafter often becomes unrecognizable after it is buffeted and
mauled by the forces, political or otherwise, that act upon it in the
course of its journey through the legislative process.
This discouraging picture is not designed to suggest that improvements cannot possibly be made, and that efforts by theorists in
legisprudence to minimize vagueness and ambiguity in legislative
language should therefore be abandoned. To the contrary, such theorists must recognize and directly confront the problems that are involved, with full awareness that the odds are stacked against reaching Nirvana. One should not, in the language of Tourtoulon, "throw
to the dogs all that is not fit for the altar of the gods." 2
B.

The "Public Interest"

Judging by the pervasive use and abuse of the concept "public
interest" in conjunction with the justification of legislative proposals
and enactments, an important task for legisprudence is the clarification of the concept and an assessment of its functioning role as a
standard for evaluation. There are some who would assign the concept to the trash bin, because of its use as a rhetorical device for
deceiving the unwary in a bid for power and authority.29 Yet, the
very fact that the concept has been used by the unscrupulous is an
implicit tribute to its normative force-much as the need of the hypocrite to employ pretense is an implicit recognition of the persuasive
power of truth.
Some theorists, in a serious attempt at analysis, have concluded
26. See Greenhouse, Probing Congressional Intent Seems at Best to Be Untidy, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 1982, at A16, col. 3.
27. C. ILBERT, LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS 230 (1901).
28. P. DE ToURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 348 (M. Read
trans. 1922).
29. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 219-24 (1960).
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that no possible meaning can be ascribed to the concept of "public
interest"-that it is an unanalyzable abstraction so vague in meaning that it cannot be employed for any useful purpose. 0 Therefore,
such theorists conclude that all that can be expected from its use is a
confused, conceptual muddle.$1 Perhaps, much of the latter difficulty
lies in the erroneous assumption that a single, purified meaning of
the concept is necessary for the elimination of the "muddle." The
many competing voices that separately lay claim to the "true" meaning of the concept are, in a way, no different than the voices of the
blind men in their claims to the "true" description of the elephant--each one certain that the part examined constitutes the
whole. More technically, the multiple accounts of the concept "public interest" may, on closer examination, be no more than different
stipulative definitions, i.e. resolves by each particular theorist to utilize the concept in a certain way for stated or presumed purposes.
Multiple perspectives do not compete, nor need they confuse; they
are simply implicit acknowledgements of the complexity of the subject-matter, functioning as separate but joint contributors to the illumination of the whole.
Some might disclaim the possibility of any meaning to the concept "public interest" by presuming: (1) that interest and desire are
synonymous; (2) that "public" means all the individuals in a political entity; (3) that there is no single desire acknowledged to everyone's advantage; (4) that legislative policy-making is a function of
competing, conflicting forces; and (5) that, therefore, there can be no
public interest-only individual or group interests. The concept,
under this view, has value only as a rhetorical device to gloss over
the divisiveness of an intrinsic political pluralism. Others might find
meaning in the term "public interest" not in any substantive goal,
but rather in terms of process-the procedures by which all interests
have a public voice and representation in the adjustment or reconciliation of competing claims. 2 Some insist that careful analytic distinctions between desire, need, and interest must precede any attempt to
corral the properties of the term "public interest. '3 3 Others equate
"public" not with any numerical count, but rather with a community
ideal of citizenship, which requires that individuals and groups rise
30. See, e.g., id. at 220.
31. See, e.g., id; see also Sorauf, The Conceptual Muddle, in Nomos V: THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 186 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
32. See, e.g., Sorauf, The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19 J. POL. 616, 633 (1957).
33. See, e.g., J. PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SociETY 311-18 (1963).
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above their special, private concerns and adopt a more "other-directed," general point of view-a public view of interest. 34 Candidates for this general point of view are perhaps as varied as are the
moral positions that are grounded in the diversity of modern ethical
theories. "Public" and "community" are often equated- "community" being regarded by some as being something more than the aggregate sum of all of its parts;35 while others insist that "community" means no more than one of many patterns of relationships
between individuals, and reject as mystical any attempt to endow the
concept with a separate reified personality of its own-like the concept "state" or "sovereign. ' a In short, the concept "public interest"
embraces a number of competing, and not always consistent, points
of view.
The legisprudential theorist cannot avoid confronting the analytic and other complex problems that surround the notion of "public
interest." It is an integral part of the professional vocabulary of lawyers, 'judges, and legislators. The concept is constantly employed not
only before courts when lawyers seek to fill the void of vague and
ambiguous language by resort to arguments of "public interest" or
"public policy," but also by lawyers who help frame justificatory arguments at legislative hearings-in reports, or in the debates that
course through the legislative process. Legisprudence would seem to
have a special duty to help untangle some of the analytic and justificatory problems that surround the concept and contribute to the debate concerning its usefulness as an operative concept, i.e. whether it
merits dignity and serious concern, or warrants a definitive demise.
C.

The Problem of Legislative or Judicial Supremacy: The Field
of Human Rights

Much has been made of the distinction between policy and principle, the former thought to relate generally to matters of social welfare, economic, and otherwise, the latter to protection of basic individual human rights--often against the excesses of majoritarian
power.3: 7 This analytic distinction, however blurred in application,
34.
EST,

See, e.g., Cassinelli, The Public Interest in PoliticalEthics, in THE PUBLIC INTER-

Nomos V 45-46 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
35. See, e.g., Cairns, The Community as the Legal Order, in NoMos II: COMMUNITY 29

(C. Friedrich ed. 1959).

36. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
(Hafner trans. 1948).
37. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-23 (1977).

OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 3
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has served almost automatically as a normative basis for the allocation of "ultimacies" among the competing claims for final and supreme authority under the Constitution.38 Although the Supreme
Court early this century thought otherwise,39 it is now widely assumed that policy matters dealing with issues of social welfare
should be the primary responsibility of the legislative branch,40 while
the protection of individual human rights is the primary and ultimate responsibility of the judiciary.41 As a result, much of the
Court's recent activist period reflects a belief that it is the judicial
and not the legislative branch that ought to be the ultimate spokesman and guardian of the principles that protect these basic rights.42
If the claim that the judiciary is the better guardian of individual rights is based on historic usage, the evidence is a bit
43
cloudy-witness such landmark cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford
and Plessy v. Ferguson,44 in which it was the Court that played the
role of subjugator of the rights of individuals. The undulating roles
of the Court in the course of American history should put one on
guard against assuming that there is something inherent in the judicial process that qualifies it to be the ultimate formulator of the basic principles for the protection of basic human rights. In English
history it has been Parliament and not the judiciary that has carved
out the basic principles that make up Britain's unwritten constitu38. See id. at 131-49.
39. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (regulation of entry into
business violates liberty of contract); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (regulation of gasoline prices violates due process); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525

(1923) (regulation of wages violates fifth amendment); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (regulation of working hours violates liberty of contract).

40. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (adopting general
"hands off" approach to legislative decisions in areas of business, economy and social affairs);

Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 575, 582-84
(1967).
41. In recent years, the Supreme Court has handed down a number of decisions championing individual rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to free exercise of religion); Brandenburg v.

Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (right to free speech); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy). For a discussion of the role of the Court in individual rights contro-

versies, see Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769, 787-89 (1971).
42.
43.

See cases cited supra note 41.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)

(a slave, as property, cannot claim rights as a

"citizen").
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ("separate but equal" segregated school system was not in
violation of equal protection clause).
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tion,"5 and has contributed to the formulation of many of the basic
rights under the American Constitution.46 Neither historic complacency with the role of the judiciary in this respect, nor the absence of
a present crisis which would generate immediate attention to the
problem, should deny to legisprudence the ongoing critical task of
determining: (1) whether such complacent practice is consistent with
democratic theory; and (2) whether it should be. Legisprudence has
the additional task of suggesting corrective measures if the first determination is found to be in the negative, and the second in the
affirmative.
One of the complexities of the issue involves the very nature and
locus of the concept "basic human rights." The simplistic notion that
discrete principles concerning such rights are discoverable in the language of the Constitution has given way to the realist's view that:
(1) only the language of general framework is discoverable; (2) for
all practical purposes, it is the particulars, not the framework, that
make up the substantive content of these rights, and (3) the chiseling-out of particulars is an act of creation-of value choice-no matter how much the impact is softened by the label "interpretation." It
is often thought that the general principles of "human rights" involve such civil liberties as freedom of speech, press, religion, but in
the past, the Court has not hesitated to regard property rights as
another basic human right and thus to treat legislative policy that
restricted the exercise of property rights as a violation of the human
rights of the owners of property.' 7 Accordingly, the line between policy and principle is dependent on the eye-and, not insignificantly,
the power--of the observer. The question of consonance with democratic theory comes to the forefront when the formulation of basic
"rights" principles is a function of a body immunized from the electorate, often divided in outlook, and endowed with the power to veto
an overwhelming expression of principle of the legislative body by a
mere majority of one. The problem is not new; it will continue to
persist, and theorists in legisprudence owe it both a long-range perspective and an intellectual vigil. It is a normative, evaluative problem, not a descriptive one; it cuts considerably deeper than the issue
of judicial restraint in relation to legislative expression of principle;
it probes the very allocation of "final say" in the determination of
such principles within the framework of democratic theory; it raises
45. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
46. See generally id. at 42-78.
47. See cases cited supra note 39.

OF AMERICAN LAW 17-18 (1973).
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questions concerning the comparative infallibility quotients of the judicial and legislative bodies, respectively. 48 Thomas Jefferson long
ago raised the question in a letter to a correspondent: "You seem to
consider the judges as the ultimate arbiter of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine, indeed, and one which would place
us under the despotism of an oligarch. ' ' 49 Thinking about the problem today as if it were being debated in Jefferson's time requires
somewhat of a wrench from habit and complacency. In considering
the problem of "final say," emphasis need not be placed merely on
attempts to minimize the potential for regrettable excesses by the
legislative body, if that is where "final say" is deemed to belong.
Rather, the problem requires focusing upon how, if at all, it is possible to devise imaginative mechanisms for curbing excesses-be they
legislative or judicial-without the sacrifice of democratic principles.
D.

The Integration of Legislation and Adjudication

Much of the early discussion of the integration of legislation
and adjudication centered on the need to remind the courts to search
for principles underlying varied discrete rules and to allow these
principles to insinuate themselves in the determination of whether
modification of the rigidities of the common law are in order. 50 Today, the discussion of the problem is centered less on the intractability of common-law-minded judges, than on the need to treat legislation at least as equal or coordinate in authority with judge-made
51 and at most, as a subsequent and overriding superior authorrules,
ity.52 This discussion of the integration of legislation and adjudica48. "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
concurring).
final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
49. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820) in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160-61 (Ford ed. 1897).
50. See Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949). Justice Douglas stated:
[J]udges have been admonished to hold steadfast to ancient precedents ....
This search for static security ... is misguided. The fact is that security can
only be achieved through constant change, through the wise discarding of old ideas
that have outlived their usefulness, and through the adapting of others to current
facts. There is only an illusion of safety in a Maginot Line.
Id. at 735.
51. See, e.g., Horack, supra note 3, at 53-56.
52. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (e) (1976), under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, despite the fact that the disputed section of the Act in effect overruled the
Court's previous holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959)). See also Cox, The Role of Congress In ConstitutionalDeterminations,40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199 (1971).
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tion has also stressed the need to incorporate legislative precedent
analogically into the judicial reasoning process as courts have done
analogically with judicial precedents, i.e. by extracting pattern and
principle from a series of discrete judicial decisions.5" The claim for
overriding authority is evidenced by the flexing of legislative muscle
in recent attempts to limit the scope of appellate judicial review,"
and to reverse directional lines of judicial decisions by overriding enactments 5 and by proposals for constitutional amendments. 56 The
task of extracting pattern and principle from a series of discrete legislative enactments has been thought to belong primarily to a court
when a specific problem of interpretation or of constitutionality is
brought to its attention in a litigious situation. Aside from the fact
that it is an ongoing task to be shared by theorists in legisprudence
as well, it would be of interest and value to compare the judicial
extractions of principle with those who undertake the extractions
from a legislative point of view.
E. Problems of Criticism
Legislation may be evaluated in terms of: (1) whether its
avowed purpose or purposes have been efficiently achieved; (2)
whether it is consistent with other expressions of overall legislative
policy; and (3) whether it is morally justifiable. The first type of
evaluation is technical, involving an assessment of the efficiency of
social engineering on a broad and varied scale. Consequences other
than those intended, often the result of a lack of appropriate study,
frustrate legislative purpose-e.g., rent control for the poor resulting
unwittingly in the deterioration of property and in the perpetuation
of ghettos; subsidies to help farmers resulting in corporate farm ventures and, unwittingly, in the concomitant reduction in the number
of farmers. A determination of whether legislative mechanisms for
53. See Horack, supra note 3, at 41-49. See also Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and
the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 416-19 (1961).
54. See, e.g., H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (forbidding court-ordered busing

of students); S. 4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (limiting jurisdiction in obscenity cases); see
generally Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,
83 YALE LJ. 498 (1974).
55. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 1035, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (banning busing of school

children); SJ. Res. 165, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (banning busing of school children). See
also supra note 20.
56. See S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (constitutional amendment to allow
states to restrict right to abortion which would, if adopted, negate Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)). The twenty-sixth amendment, allowing eighteen year olds to vote in all state elections
negated Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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the control of the production and sale of narcotics, street crime, or
recidivism, are fruitful and efficient, involves vast resources for empirical research and specially trained skills. A major problem of
legisprudence is the obtaining and harnessing of the resources and
talent necessary for such evaluative tasks. Many critical studies have
forced a fundamental rethinking of many conventional legislative attitudes-witness, for example, the work on the effect of death penalties57 or on alcoholism as an illness. 58 Much more needs to be done
systematically to maximize the efficiency of legislative engineering.
The elusive problem of the efficacy of sanctions is high on the list of
needed critical study.
Criticism based on the inconsistency of legislative policy is in
the interest of a rational ordering of human affairs. Inconsistency is
disruptive, produces uncertainty and often results in claims of injustice and disrespect for law. At times, judicial principles of statutory
construction are not sufficiently elastic to correct such defects, and
disharmony, accordingly results. The problem was pointed out in the
early part of the century in Ernst Freund's classic work on legislation with the following example:
When the legislature made the wife the mistress of her own property or income, it should have placed upon her a correlative obligation to contribute to the support of household and family. This has
been done by the German Civil Code, but not by American or English married women's acts. We have thus the anomaly that a rich
wife may obtain a divorce from a 59poor husband for non-support
where that is a ground for divorce.
The problem is obviously ongoing, and is a function of the nature
and complexity inherent in the legislative process. The average legislator and his staff have little time or inclination to survey the disparate enactments in statute books searching for larger patterns of policy and principle to determine whether a discrete proposal might
properly fit within such patterns or lead to a jarring note of inconsistency. Occasionally, legislative staff members of committees that
57. See, e.g.,

THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA

(H. Bedau ed. 1964); Ehrlich & Gib-

bons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of
Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977); Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Blinder & Kornblum, The Alcoholic Driver A Proposalfor Treatment as
an Alternative to Punishment, 56 JUDICATURE 24 (1972); Committee on Problems Relating to
Persons Under Disability and Their Property, Alcoholics and the Mentally Ill: Their Institutionalizationand De-Institutionalization,7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 532 (1972).
59. E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 228 (1917).
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prepare reports after hearings on proposals provide a longer-ranged
perspective,60 but such occurences are far too infrequent. There is
clearly great need of efforts by more detached critics to perform the
necessary research and critical tasks. Much of the content of law
reviews is devoted to the examination of inconsistencies in judicial
opinions or in the long-ranged patterns that are discerned in disparate judicial pronouncements; analogous energies could well be
poured into journals that do not deal occasionally or peripherally
with legislation per se, but whose central subject-matter is legislation. 6 '
Legisprudence shares with judicativeprudence the problem of
the morality of the procedures, principles, and substantive policies
that are the products of the legal order. In the case of legisprudence,
moral criticism is directed to the legislative component of the legal
order. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between conventional (positive) morality and critical morality. Conventional morality may itself be subject to criticism in terms of ideal principles that
conventional moral practices contravene-principles that are believed, by those who hold them, to be universally applicable and
which are thought to be ultimately acceptable to the tentatively unconvinced after rational discussion. Thus, legislation that establishes
second-class citizenship on the basis of race, color, or creed, for example, may be criticized on two moral levels: (1) because of its variance with American principles of morality (conventional); or (2) because it is at variance with principles that, it is believed, rational
people generally hold dear-the fact of adoption by any particular
legal order being an irrelevant consideration. Thus, some basic principles that underly legislative practice-- for example, nulla poena
sine lege; no legal coercion unless justified by some communal
good-are often thought of as embodying not merely American
moral convictions, but principles that should, it is believed, apply to
all mankind in general.
The eight procedural requirements, proposed by Professor Lon
Fuller for distinguishing a valid legal enactment from the commands
60.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 557 (committee report on child abuse prevention); S. REP. No. 493, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedIn 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504 (committee report on

age discrimination).
61.

The HarvardJournal on Legislation is a rare exception to the prevailing practice at

law schools.
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of a mobster or tyrant,6 2 serve as a good starting point for the articulation of norms for evaluating the formal elements of legislation.
Such procedural requirements as clarity, publication, or prospective
operation, are not only minimal conditions for the efficient enforcement of legal enactments, but are also expressions of the morality of
means as distinguished from ends. However varied are the principles
that have been advanced for governing moral purposes or needs,
there is broader agreement within these varied theories on the morality of procedural means for achieving them.
Criticism of the substantive content of legislative proposals and
enactments on moral grounds requires entrance into the dense and
controversial thickets of ethical theory. Many moral judgments on
specific issues converge, even though they flow from different theoretical premises-Kantian, 83 Utilitarian," Rawlsian,6 5 Natural
Law, 66 etc. When they do not converge, the problems for legisprudence are the problems of ethical theory: i.e., how to make persuasive sense out of the various claims to objectivity (the latter term
has varied meanings) in the search for ethical moorings; how, if at
all, to distinguish the "discovery" of ethical principles from acts of
commitment and exhortation; how to recognize moral "deliverance"
even though clothed in secular and often scientific dress; and
whether ethical theories are falsifiable or otherwise verifiable in the
same or analogous sense that scientific theories purport to be. Three
problems involving substantive legislation and related ethical theory
are presently on center stage: (1) the extent to which government
should legislate in the area of private morality-a problem involving
the theories of Mill, 67 Devlin, 8 Hart6 9 and others; (2) the extent to
which the goal of maximum utility should bend to the demands of
justice-a problem involving theories of Kant,70 Bentham,71 Rawls72
-62. These relate to generality, publication, retroactivity, understandability, contradiction, possibility of conformity, abruptness of change, and coherence between rules and their
administration. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964).

63. See I. KANT,

KANT's CRITIQUE

OF PRACTICAL REASON (T. Abbott trans. 6th ed.

1909).

J. BENTAM, supra note 36; J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
A.P. D'ENTRbVES, NATURAL LAW (1951).
J. MILL, supra note 64.
P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See
See
See
See
See
See

70.

See I. KANT, supra note 63.

71.

See J. BENTHAM, supra note 36.

72.

See J. RAwLs, supra note 65.
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and others; and (3) whether lack of moral blameworthiness should in
all instances foreclose legal responsibility-a problem involving such
complex and controversial notions as fault, causation, determinism,
and freedom. These problems assume concrete reality in current debate over substantive legislative proposals. The first involves such
legislative issues as the regulation of pornography, abortion, and homosexuality. The second involves issues such as equality of opportunity, in which the needs and concerns of the disadvantaged are
claimed by some to be a matter of moral right, and by others to be
no more than dependent variables tied only to the achievement of
maximum utility. Finally, the third problem concerns such issues as
whether the absence of mens rea, for example, in cases of insanity or
other forms of mental illness, should excuse legal responsibility; if so,
to what extent; and whether the pressing need for the control and
prevention of anti-social behavior (by preventive detention, for example) should minimize or completely bypass the requirement of fault.
On the non-substantive side, a recurrent problem of central importance concerns the extent to which procedures for electing legislators
and for establishing legislative policies and principles are at variance
with moral principles of fairness and equality that underlie democratic ideals. The problem has been raised concretely in recent criticism of the methods by which private interest groups, by means of
the proliferation of political action committees (PACS), are able to
circumvent financial limits on expenditures for candidates,
thus
73
warping the democratic process of political participation.
If legisprudence is not to shrink from these basic legislative
problems, it cannot afford to blink at the ethical theories that underlie their criticism and evaluation. They are the essential tools for
legisprudential criticism and evaluation. Without them, legisprudence would be justifiably characterized as being adrift-without
mooring or foundation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The proposed agenda for legisprudence is suggestive, and it does
not pretend to be exhaustive. Other problems might loom large in
the eyes of other observers. Beyond new enthusiasms that might be
stirred or renewed by the proposed agenda, implementation is not
simply a matter of the addition of just another course to the curriculum of a law school. Much more is required, not the least of which
73.

See Etzioni, Congress P.A.C.'d, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1982, at A29, col. 2.
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involves a thoroughgoing change in thinking by judges and lawyers
concerning the legislative decision-making process, and a significant
change in the professional and critical role of law schools in dealing
with the problems of the legal order from a broader view than that
of a judicially oriented perspective.
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